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5From Mobilized to Autonomous Voting
This chapter lays the ground for the main arguments by scrutinizing the nature of
electoral participation in Turkey. The concept of electoral volatility implicitly as-
sumes that voters cast ballots of their own will, autonomously. In the rural areas of
Turkey, however, “mobilized” voting was traditionally prevalent, according to Nuhrat
(1971) and Özbudun (1976).1 Mobilized voting, as explicitly phrased by Özbudun for
Turkey, refers to either induced or deferential voting for local notables. For the
interpretation of electoral volatility, therefore, it is very important to determine whether
voting is relatively autonomous or mobilized. Large electoral volatility under autono-
mous voting implies weak voter loyalty (or trust) toward political parties. Under
mobilized voting, on the other hand, electoral volatility does not reflect party loyalty
to a great degree. In practice, voting behavior involves both autonomous and mobi-
lized motives. In this study, autonomous and mobilized voting are used in relative
terms, and mobilized voting in particular is limited to the above sense.
The main contention of this chapter is that electoral participation in Turkey over the
last four decades has become more autonomous and less mobilized. What follows in
this chapter is first an overview of voter turnout at the national level during the 1961–
2002 period and an explanation of the major reasons for quantitative and qualitative
changes in voter turnout. Second, the relationship between socioeconomic develop-
ment and voter turnout is examined at the provincial level for the general elections
during the above period. This is because Özbudun argued that a positive relationship
between socioeconomic development and electoral participation in a province indi-
cated autonomous participation whereas a negative relationship suggested mobilized
participation. Third, in order to supplement the second inquiry, another indicator,
party competition, is used to measure autonomous/mobilized participation at the sub-
province level over time.
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5.1. National Voter Turnout
Two major factors have influenced voter turnout in general elections in Turkey. First,
turnout has tended to be higher in the post-1980 period than in the pre-1980 period
(Figure 5-1). This is because the 1983 electoral law (Law No. 2839), passed on June
10, 1983, made voting compulsory. Article 63 of the law stipulates a fine, imposed by
the sub-provincial election board chairman, on registered eligible voters who, without
legitimate reason, do not participate in either the general election or the by-election of
the parliament. Actually, the author was unable to come across any reports or personal
remarks indicating that such fines had ever been levied. It is plausible, however, that
the possibility, though very small, of being fined and the sense of obligation that the
law generated among the voters induced voter turnout to be higher than in the pre-
1980 period.
Second, however, there has been substantial variance in voter turnout from election
to election, both for the periods before and since 1983. A surge in electoral participa-
tion seems to accompany a transition from military to civilian rule2 or the incorpora-
tion of untapped voters into a party’s constituency. In 1961, a general election was
held for the first time since the 1960 military intervention (and the introduction of
Turkey’s most democratic 1961 constitution). During the election campaign, the
newly created AP demanded a political amnesty for the convicted members of its
predecessor, the DP, which had been dissolved by the military government. These
factors probably raised popular interest in this election. The ensuing short-lived coali-
tion governments most probably disappointed voters, particularly those in the middle
class (Abadan and Yücekök 1967, p. 107), and national voter turnout declined.
Fig. 5-1. National Voter Turnout, 1961–2002
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix III.
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In 1972, the CHP chose a new leader, Bülent Ecevit. The party then consolidated its
ideological shift to the center-left and became increasingly popular with the urban
masses. The turnout increase between 1969 and 1973 was more significant in cities,
where the CHP had strengthened its appeal, than in villages.3 The 1983 general
election was a transition election from the 1980–83 military government, although
only three parties were allowed to participate. The 1987 election was the first com-
petitive general election after the civilian transition in 1983. These pivotal elections
produced higher voter turnout than did the other elections in the same period (either
before 1983 or since 1983).
5.2. Invalid Votes
The introduction of compulsory voting in 1983 reduced the abstention rate. How,
then, have former or potential nonvoters come to vote since then? Do they cast votes
for parties or independent candidates? Or do they intentionally cast invalid votes?
Figure 5-2 shows that for potential nonvoters, voting for a party is the norm while
casting an invalid vote is contingent on political situations. Between the periods
before and after the introduction of compulsory voting, the period-average rate of
invalid votes to the total votes cast does not significantly differ. It is likely that most of
the former nonvoters turned out and cast valid votes. Since 1983, however, the vari-
ance of invalid votes has been larger than in the previous period.4
The occurrence of invalid votes has become more dependent on the political con-
text. The high rate of invalid votes in 1983 may well have reflected some voters’
protest against the exclusion of all but three parties from the general election. In the
1995 and 1999 general elections, the growth of invalid votes coincided with height-
ened political distrust, as shown by the corruption perceptions index (Table 5-1).5
Fig. 5-2. Invalid Votes, 1961–2002
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix III.
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Casting invalid votes, however, is not widespread. A change in the rate of invalid votes
has contributed at most to about a 2-percentage-point change in the rate of voter
turnout between consecutive elections.
5.3. Relationship with Socioeconomic Development
The relationship between voter turnout and socioeconomic development changed
significantly during the last four decades. The regular line in Figure 5-3 shows the
relationship between provincial socioeconomic development and provincial voter
turnout, and the broken line shows voter turnout at the national level. From 1961 to
1969, as already shown by Özbudun (1976), the relationship between socioeconomic
development and voter turnout was either insignificant (1961 and 1965) or negative
(1969 and 1973). Later, however, the relationship swung to the reverse. Since the
1980s, a positive relationship has been established, in which voter turnout is higher in
the more developed than less developed regions.
Why, then, did the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter
turnout at the provincial level change so dynamically? There are two major reasons.
One is short-term and the other long-term. First, the above-mentioned relationship in
the provinces depends on the level of national (or provincial-average) voter turnout. If
national voter turnout is relatively high compared with other election years, the
relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout in the provinces
becomes positive and vice versa. This is due to different impacts of socioeconomic
development on autonomous versus mobilized voting.
In general, autonomous voting is positively related with socioeconomic develop-
ment. After reviewing elections in democracies, Lijphart (2000) concluded that higher
socioeconomic status (in terms of income, wealth, and education) led to higher voting
turnout (pp. 314–22).  Franklin (1996) found that for 22 democracies, individual
incomes were positively correlated with voting turnout.  According to another study,
the level of human development also explained the difference in voter turnout across
countries, both democratic and non-democratic. The higher the value of the United
Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI), the higher the electoral participation in
the country (IDEA 2002). For the United Kingdom, Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992)
TABLE 5-1
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX FOR TURKEY, 1980–2003
1980–85 1988–92 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CPI 4.06 4.05 3.54 3.21 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1
Source: Compiled by the author from the web site of the Internet Center for Corruption Research,
accessible from http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~uwvw/corruption.index.html. This site is a joint initia-
tive of the University of Passau and Transparency International.
Note: The corruption perceptions index (CPI) is a composite rank index generated from evalua-
tions by businessmen and country specialists on the extent of corruption practices among public
servants and politicians in a particular country. The higher the rank, the more serious the corruption.
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asserted that wealth increases voter turnout, based on the findings of a sample survey
of nearly 1,600 people.  Even in the apparently outlier case of Japan, where voting
turnout is known to be higher in less developed constituencies, multiple regression
analyses showed that it was the age of the voter, and not economic development
(measured by the income level), that accounted for the higher voting rate in the less
developed constituencies (Kabashima 1989). Similarly, Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies
(1998) also pointed to more intense social networks in rural than urban sub-provinces
in explaining the higher turnout among rural than urban voters in Japan.
In Turkey too, voter turnout in the (dominantly autonomous-voting) 6 cities has
been positively correlated with socioeconomic development since the 1960s.7 Since
autonomous votes tend to vary between elections, they significantly affect changes in
national voter turnout. Mobilized votes, on the other hand, are relatively predictable
and do not vary significantly between elections. The proportion of autonomous votes
to total votes tends to be high when national voter turnout is high, whereas the
proportion of mobilized votes tends to be high when national turnout is low. Thus,
high national voter turnout reflects higher/lower turnout in more/less developed re-
gions while low national voter turnout represents higher/lower turnout in less/more
developed regions.
Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4 illustrate that contention. In Figure 5-3, the correlation
coefficient between voter turnout and per capita GDP in provinces (the regular line)
moves in tandem with the national voter turnout (the dotted line).8 In this figure,
however, each of the two variables is autocorrelated.9 Figure 5-4 shows the relation-
ship between the two variables with autocorrelation controlled for, by taking their
first-order differences. The horizontal axis measures changes, between two consecu-
Fig. 5-3. Voter Turnout and Autonomous Voting, 1961–2002
Sources: Calculated and compiled by the author from SIS (1988a, 1998b,
2000, 2003); Özötün (1988); State Planning Organization’s website, acces-
sible from http://www.dpt.gov.tr/.
Note: A positive correlation indicates that autonomous voting was preva-
lent across provinces. Correlation coefficients were statistically significant
at the 0.05 level except for 1961, 1965, and 1977.
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tive elections, in the correlation coefficient between voter turnout and per capita GDP
at the provincial level. A plus change means that voting became more autonomous
than in the previous election, and a minus means that voting became more mobilized
than in the previous election. The vertical axis measures changes in the voter turnout
percentage. It was confirmed that an increment in the correlation coefficient (between
voter turnout and per capita GDP at the provincial level) was positively correlated
with an increment in national voter turnout (r = 0.823, p < 0.01).10
Admittedly, there was a clear break in the voting trend before and after 1983, and
the introduction of compulsory voting in 1983 contributed to this change. In that year,
the rate of autonomous votes to mobilized votes rose suddenly. This is because voter
turnout increased due to the new participation of previous nonvoters. Although these
new voters decided to take part in the election, in order to avoid fines, most of them
were apparently not “mobilized” to vote for particular parties or candidates. Thus,
while the reason for the increase in autonomous votes was institutional rather than
behavioral, the net result was that mobilized voting became less prevalent.
The second reason is long-term social change, including urbanization11 and rural
development. Rapid urbanization since the 1960s led to a rise in the proportion of
urban voter turnout to total provincial voter turnout. Urban voting behavior (repre-
sented by a positive relationship between voter turnout and socioeconomic develop-
ment) thus increasingly shaped voting behavior in the province as a whole. Rural
Sources: Calculated by the author from the data for Figure 5-3.
Notes: 1. Change in Pearson’s r between voter turnout and per capita
GDP at the provincial level: ∆rt = rt − rt−1
2. Change in turnout percentage: ∆vt = vt − vt−1
3. Labels show election years.
Fig. 5-4. Change in Turnout and Change in Pearson’s r, 1965–2002 (N = 10)
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development brought about a continuing reduction in the political and economic
influence of local notables. In the least developed regions such as southeastern Anatolia,
the development of infrastructure and mass communication, especially since the
beginning of the Southeastern Anatolian Project (Güneydo%gu Anadolu Projesi, or
GAP), weakened the tribal and feudalistic structure in the region.12 In the meantime,
the introduction of compulsory voting also added to voter turnout in the rural areas,
though less significantly than in the urban areas. This presumably had the effect of
increasing the rate of autonomous to mobilized votes.
The urban-rural difference in voter turnout also conforms to the above findings.
Voter turnout used to be significantly higher in the rural than urban sub-province but
this difference has shrunken considerably since the 1970s (Table 5-2). A possible
reason is that when national voter turnout began to increase in the early 1970s, urban
turnout accounted for most of it. Thus, this process has been a recovery in the
significant decrease in urban turnout in the late 1960s. There was little room for a
further increase in rural turnout, which remained stable at a high level. Another
possibility is that rural voting behavior began to approximate urban voting behavior,
as will be discussed later.
TABLE 5-2
URBAN AND RURAL VOTER TURNOUT, 1961–95
1961 1965 1969 1973 1991 1995
Urban 74.6 66.2 56.3 62.7 81.6 81.8
Rural 83.2 77.3 68.1 69.4 87.2 86.1
Difference −8.6 −11.1 −11.8 −6.7 −5.6 −4.3
Number of provinces 67 67 67 67 73 76
Sources: Compiled by the author; for 1961–73 from Özbudun (1976, 1980) and for 1991–95 from
SIS (1992, 1996)
Note: For 1977, 1983, 1987, 1999, and 2002, the State Institute of Statistics did not show urban and
rural voting turnout by province.
TABLE 5-3
VOTER TURNOUT AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, URBAN VS. RURAL
1969a 1991 1995
Urban 0.213* 0.297** 0.426***
Rural −0.452*** 0.274** 0.531***
Province −0.569*** 0.388*** 0.580***
Urban-rural gap 0.513*** 0.129 0.146
Number of provinces 67 73 76
Sources: See Figure 5-3.
Notes: Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Compiled electoral data for urban and rural
constituencies were available for only these general elections.
a For per capita provincial income, the 1979 data were used.
***
 p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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The long-term changes thus manifested themselves as a transformation of voting
behavior in the rural area. For rural Turkey in the 1960s, Özbudun (1976) found a
negative relationship between voter turnout and socioeconomic development. By the
early 1990s, however, the relationship between the two variables had reversed. Table
5-3 shows that for 1991 and 1995 even in rural areas, voter turnout is positively
correlated with socioeconomic development. Similarly, the urban-rural gap in voting
turnout, which Özbudun referred to as an indication of mobilized voting, is no longer
significantly correlated with socioeconomic development in the 1990s.
5.4. Relationship with Party Competition
It would be desirable to confirm the above results at a lower level, such as the sub-
provincial level. At this level, however, socioeconomic data is very difficult to come
by. Instead, this section explores the relationship between party competition and voter
turnout to look for evidence of autonomous/mobilized voting. Özbudun (1976, pp.
169–73) showed that in rural Turkey, single-party dominance in a village was often a
sign of mobilized voting. It would be possible to apply the same logic to all sub-
provinces nationwide to investigate the relationship between party competition and
voter turnout over time. If mobilized voting is prevalent in the country, then high/low
voter turnout should coincide with single-party/no dominance, or low/high party
competition. If autonomous voting is prevalent, then high/low voter turnout should be
observed with high/low party competition, which heightens/dampens voter interest.13
It is thus assumed here that an association between high/low turnout and low/high
party competition attests to the prevalence of mobilized voting, whereas an associa-
tion between high/low turnout and high/low party competition indicates the preva-
lence of autonomous voting. When no statistically significant relationship exists be-
tween voter turnout and party competition, the mode of electoral participation is most
probably an even mixture of mobilized and autonomous voting.
Table 5-4 shows that over the years, the relationship between party competition and
voter turnout has changed from being negative to being statistically insignificant. In
earlier years, sub-provinces with low competitiveness, or high one-party dominance,
had high voter turnout. A large percentage of voters went to the polls presumably not
so much because they were interested in the almost predetermined electoral results in
TABLE 5-4
SINGLE-PARTY DOMINANCE AND VOTER TURNOUT BY SUB-PROVINCE, 1961–95
1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995
r .123*** .080** .077* .264*** .245*** − .013 − .047 − .051 − .132***
N 636 637 638 638 638 640 646 894 918
Source: Calculated and compiled by the author from SIS (1998a, 1998b).
Note: Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the voter turnout percentage and the
squared percentage of votes cast for the largest party in the sub-province.
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their sub-province, as because they felt obliged to vote for the dominant party in the
sub-province. In sub-provinces where no dominant party could exert pressure on
voters, they did not feel a strong urge to cast their ballots.
Since 1983, the relationship between voter turnout and party competition may
seem inconclusive. There is, however, a clear trend toward a more autonomous voting
pattern. The correlation coefficients are consistently negative and the strength of the
correlation has increased for every new general election. Consequently, for the 1995
election the coefficient has become significant at the 0.01 level. As was stated just
earlier, a sudden shift in the trend in 1983 was largely due to the introduction of
compulsory voting. The fact remains, however, that compulsory voting generated a
larger proportion of autonomous votes to total votes than in past elections. This
growing weight of autonomous votes probably contributed to a tangible decline in
mobilized voting.
5.5. Summary
This chapter has shown changes in electoral participation during the last four decades.
Table 5-5 summarizes the major findings. First, in the long term, the level of national
voter turnout was higher under compulsory voting after 1983 than in the previous two
decades. In the short term, however, national voter turnout significantly varied be-
tween elections due to political factors, during both the former and the latter two
decades.
Second, the average rate of invalid votes did not significantly differ between the
periods before and after the introduction of compulsory voting, while the variance in
the rate of invalid votes was greater after the introduction of compulsory voting than
before. Now that voters have more difficulty resorting to abstention, invalid votes
seem to more sensitively reflect voter distrust than in the 1960s and 1970s.
Third, the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout at
the provincial level depends on the level of national voter turnout. Low voter turnout,
TABLE 5-5
SUMMARY OF ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY, 1961–2002
Parameters 1961–77  1983–2002
National turnout Low High
Invalid votes Stable Unstable
Urban-rural difference in turnouta Large Small
Relationship with socioeconomic development: urbanb Positive Positive
Relationship with socioeconomic development: ruralb Negative Positive
Relationship with socioeconomic development: total Negative Positive
Relationship with party competitionc Negative Positive
Source: Compiled by the author.
a
 Not tested for the 1980s.
b
 Not tested for the 1970s, the 1980s, 1999, and 2002.
c
 Not tested for 1999 and 2002.
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often caused by voter disillusionment with the political system, reduces autonomous
votes and consequently leads to an increase in the ratio of mobilized votes to total
votes. High national voter turnout, due either to democratizing elections or to compul-
sory voting, leads to increased weight for autonomous voting. The pattern of rural
electoral participation came, by the 1990s, to closely approximate that of urban
electoral participation, in which greater socioeconomic development induces higher
voter turnout. Similarly, the urban-rural difference in voter turnout has diminished
over the last two decades, pointing to a decline in mobilized voting in rural areas.
Lastly, the relationship between party competition at the sub-province level and
voter turnout provided complementary supportive evidence for a change in electoral
participation from mobilized voting to autonomous voting. In the pre-1980 period,
single-party dominance at the sub-province level led to greater voter turnout. In the
post-1980 period, this relationship disappeared. Most recently, the more competitive
sub-provinces stimulated greater turnout than did the less competitive sub-provinces.
Notes
1 Also, see the review of their studies in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.
2 In general, the first two or three elections after democratization produce high electoral
turnout (Lijphart 2000, p. 316).
3 Voting turnout rose by 6.4 percentage points in the cities but by only 1.3 percentage points
in the villages. At the same time, the CHP increased its votes by 8.8 percentage points in the
cities, compared to 3.2 percentage points in the villages. See Özbudun (1980, p. 116, Table
5.2).
4 Before voting became compulsory, the rate of invalid votes was gradually declining, pre-
sumably because a learning effect was reducing errors in voting. The same kind of errors,
however, cannot account for the greater volatility of the rate of invalid votes since 1983.
5 The major political scandals in the 1990s started with the I.SKI. (Istanbul Municipality
Water Administration) affair in the early 1990s. Later, corruption charges against former
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller after 1995 and the Susurluk affair in 1996 further revealed to
the public the prevalence and depth of political corruption in Turkey.
6 Nuhrat (1971) reported that mobilized voting was observed only in the villages.
7 Özbudun (1976) analyzed voter turnout by city size but did not find any significant relation-
ship. Baykal’s data (1970) imply such a possibility but did not go through a test of statistical
significance.
8 For socioeconomic development, the only time-series data available at the provincial level
were for per capita GDP. A better indicator of socioeconomic development would be the
Human Development Index defined by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
In the case of 1995, for which those data were available, the provincial rank (with 1 being
the highest) in the Human Development Index was more strongly associated with voter
turnout in the province (r = − 0.676) than was per capita income in the province (r = 0.529).
These results corroborate the assertion in this section that in the 1990s, socioeconomic
development at the provincial level was positively related to voter turnout.
9 Voter turnout at time t was positively correlated with voter turnout at time t − 1. Likewise,
the correlation coefficient between voter turnout and socioeconomic development at the
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provincial level at time t was positively correlated with the same correlation coefficient at
time t − 1.
10 The original autocorrelation was almost completely eliminated, with the Durbin-Watson
test statistic being 2.030.
11 In this context, urbanization constitutes one aspect of socioeconomic development and
refers solely to a rise in the proportion of the urban to rural population. Urbanization is
assumed to make the urban type of (autonomous) voting more prevalent across the nation
simply because it increases the proportion of urban population in the country.
12 The tribal and feudal structures of the Kurd-populated region appear to be in decline due to
the development of infrastructure and the mass media, especially after the realization of the
Southeastern Anatolian Project. Political instability in the region since the 1980s also
contributed to a virtual superiority of the villagers over the landlords. Some lands are under
peasants’ control while others are being sold to peasants at a low price (Adnan 1999, p.
129). In Southeastern Anatolia, “the traditional forms of land ownership, land tenure and
labor organization have been transformed into more widespread ownership in the villages
by resident farmers using more advanced agricultural technology” (Aks¸it et al. 1996, p.
59). Dogu Ergil, who prepared the report “Do%gu sorunu” [Eastern problem], published in
1995 by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchanges, asserted that in the Kurd-popu-
lated region, feudal relationships no longer existed in a practical sense. According to Ergil,
a%galık, or Kurdish lordship, does not only mean large land ownership but also rests on the
comprehensive power to sanction a large section of society. He wrote that large landowner-
ship still existed but that it had become difficult for landowners to exert punitive power over
the peasants (Nokta, Sept. 21–27, 1997, p. 9).
13 Indeterminate electoral competition increases voter perception of their importance in de-
ciding the electoral outcome.

